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Abstract 
Information automation systems are generally 
intended to support pilot tasks and improve 
flightcrew awareness and decision making, but not to 
directly control the aircraft or its systems. As a result 
these systems do not include cases where automation 
decisions and actions directly affect the aircraft 
performance, flight path or systems. Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen) operational 
concepts and technologies will dramatically affect 
both the types and amount of information available 
on flight decks. Much of that information will be 
produced by flight deck information automation 
systems that collect, process, and present that 
information to the flightcrew. It is therefore 
important to understand the human factors 
characteristics of information automation systems 
and identify human factors issues specifically related 
to information automation. This paper presents an 
investigation of two information automation 
characteristics (functional complexity and automation 
visibility) using prototype oceanic In-Trail 
Procedures (ITP) display systems. The outcome will 
be used to develop and iterate recommendations for 
design and evaluation of information automation 
systems that will mitigate the identified human 
factors issues. 
Introduction 
The goal of many, if not a majority of flight 
deck systems introduced in recent decades has been 
to perform different types of information processing 
and display functions. These systems operate by 
integrating data from multiple sources and converting 
data to information displays that are intended to be 
more intuitive to understand (e.g., a synthetic vision 
display). Information automation is devoted to the 
management and presentation of relevant information 
to flightcrew members [1]. Information automation 
can be used to integrate, summarize, distribute, 
format, abstract, prioritize, categorize, calculate, 
process, and display information in a variety of ways 
to support flightcrew tasks. Examples of information 
automation include moving maps, synthetic vision, 
advisory, and information elements of caution and 
warning systems, data communication interfaces, 
electronic charts, and electronic flight bag (EFB) 
functions. 
It is anticipated that Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) operational 
concepts and technologies will dramatically affect 
both the types and amount of information available 
on flight decks [2]. Much of that information will be 
produced by flight deck information automation 
systems that collect, process, and present that 
information to the flightcrew. It is therefore 
important that information automation designers and 
evaluators understand potential human factors issues 
related to these systems. For example, do they cause 
excessive workload in the interaction required? Do 
they provide information that may not be completely 
accurate and must be interpreted carefully by the 
flightcrew? Also, understanding “characteristics” 
which are the distinguishing attributes or features of 
information automation will help to identify human 
factors issues and develop information automation 
design/evaluation recommendations. 
This paper presents an investigation of two 
information automation characteristics (functional 
complexity and automation visibility) using prototype 
oceanic In Trail Procedures (ITP) display systems. 
Details of the selected characteristics and an 
overview of ITP are described first, followed by 
description of the method and results of an empirical 
study. Then recommendations and research gaps are 
described. The outcome of the study will be used to 
develop and iterate recommendations for design and 
evaluation of information automation systems that 
will mitigate the identified human factors issues. 
Background 
The study was conducted within the framework 
of ITP which is a NextGen operational concept that 
encapsulates the challenges of information 
automation on the flight deck. Dudley et al, [3] lists 
nine characteristics specific to information 
automation. Two of these characteristics are the focus 
of this study because they were considered to be most 
relevant to the information automation system under 
consideration. The two characteristics are functional 
complexity and automation visibility. A brief 
overview of the information automation 
characteristics under consideration and the ITP 
concept are provided in the following subsections. 
Functional complexity 
Functional complexity refers to the number and 
diversity of information automation functions, the 
intricacy of the processing, the number and type of 
inputs and outputs, and the number and nature of 
inter-relationships and inter-dependencies [4],[5]. 
Functional complexity affects error management 
because it could be more difficult to detect whether 
an information automation system with high 
functional complexity is performing as intended, and 
whether the system is providing accurate outputs [6]. 
Additionally, flightcrew interaction with complex 
information automation could distract from primary 
flight deck responsibilities and cause loss of 
positional awareness and automation mode awareness 
[7]. 
Automation visibility 
Information automation visibility refers to the 
ability of an automation system to provide adequate 
feedback about its current state, what information is 
being used, and how the information is being 
processed [8]. This characteristic may also be 
referred to as opacity [8]. In order for automation to 
be visible, the feedback must provide a view into the 
automation’s state and activities in a manner which 
can be properly interpreted by the operator and 
allows the operator to predict its behavior. This logic 
includes the sources the information automation is 
using for input and the algorithms and/or models for 
how the system is generating the outputs. A system 
with high automation visibility will allow its behavior 
to be predictable by fostering the development of an 
accurate mental model and provide ways for the 
flightcrew to verify its outputs. A system with poor 
automation visibility could create human factors 
issues such as a loss of situation awareness and 
increases in workload. However, the appropriate 
amount and timing of automation visibility 
information (e.g., “explanatory” information) should 
be carefully evaluated because too much additional 
information or supporting information presented at an 
inappropriate time (e.g., during time-critical tasks) 
could add workload and head down time [10]. 
In-Trail Procedure (ITP) 
 ITP is intended to allow pilots on oceanic routes 
to reduce the separation required to change flight 
levels in non-radar airspace. It requires the use of 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS-B) 
information to compute required distance and speed 
relative to various surrounding aircraft. An ITP flight 
level change requires the flightcrew to: (i) verify that 
a set of ITP initial criteria are met; (ii) request ITP 
flight level change clearance from Air Traffic Control 
(ATC); (iii) re-validate ITP criteria when a clearance 
is received from ATC; and (iv) execute the maneuver 
while maintaining specified ITP speed and vertical 
speed conditions. Prior research shows that pilots 
may occasionally forget important facts relevant to 
the ITP procedure. The anticipated benefits provided 
by ITP include enhanced efficiency, safety, and 
passenger comfort [11]. A complete overview of ITP 
including definitions of relevant ITP terminology is 
available [12]. 
The main goal of the current evaluation was to 
assess the information automation characteristics of 
three ITP display manipulations. Potential human 
factors issues related to ITP as an example 
information automation system are suggested by 
Murdoch et al., [11] which presents data showing 
pilot errors associated with the different stages of 
ITP. He found that several participants made 
selection errors (requesting ITP instead of standard 
clearances and vice versa), and participants in his 
study also included incorrect information in 
clearances, selected inappropriate reference aircraft, 
and made syntax errors in formulating a clearance 
request. 
Method 
Participants 
Twelve airline pilots from a cross section of 
regional and major airlines participated in the study 
(total flying hours:  2,000 - 14,000).  The study was 
conducted in a low fidelity part task simulator 
facility. Both objective and subjective data were 
collected.  
Independent Variables 
The automation level of prototype ITP displays 
was the independent variable in the study with the 
following levels: 
• Manual (high visibility, high complexity) 
• Semi-Automated (high visibility, low 
complexity) 
• Fully Automated (low visibility, low 
complexity) 
The manual concept requires the pilot to assess 
and generate an ATC clearance (high complexity). 
The semi-automated concept provides step by step 
automated ITP procedural guidance until an ATC 
downlink clearance is generated (low complexity).  
The fully automated concept provides a single-step 
automated ATC clearance generation based on 
desired flight level (low complexity). All three 
systems have a graphical ITP traffic display to show 
the basic information needed to formulate an ITP 
clearance request.  In addition, the manual and semi-
automated ITP display concepts have a traffic status 
window which provides detailed information about 
selected traffic (high visibility) while the fully 
automated does not (low visibility). 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent measures for the study included 
both subjective and objective measures. The 
subjective measures comprised questionnaire ratings, 
participant comments and workload ratings. The 
subjective data was correlated with real-time 
objective data from scenario-specific datasheets. 
The following are the dependent measures for 
the study are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Dependent Variables and Metrics 
Dependent Variable Metric 
Participant decision to 
request ITP 
Requested Decision: 
Yes/No. 
Time to generate ITP 
clearance 
Time from end of task 
instruction to ITP 
clearance request. 
Time to re-validate ATC 
ITP response 
Time from ITP 
clearance approval to 
accept/reject decision. 
ITP clearance 
accept/reject decision 
Accept/Reject 
Decision: Yes/No. 
Traffic Awareness Identification of non-
reference traffic (Non-
ITP criteria traffic). 
Percentage of ITP task 
time spent on ITP Help 
information (ITP 
Checklist) 
Total head-tracker 
dwell time (per trial). 
Subjective workload  Bedford workload 
scale. 
Subjective ratings and 
comments on 
information automation 
aspects of ITP displays. 
5-point response scale.  
 
Experiment Design 
A within-subject (repeated measures) design was 
used for this evaluation. All participants viewed five 
scenarios for all three ITP display types. An 
additional scenario was designed for training to 
familiarize participants with the simulation 
environment and the features of the ITP display 
types. One scenario was specifically designed to 
investigate decision aiding aspects of the displays 
based on the information automation characteristics. 
An ITP distance requirement was not met in the 
scenario. The participant was expected to identify 
this discrepancy without requesting an ITP clearance 
(correct decision). All scenarios were based on a 
route between Tokyo and Los Angeles. 
The order of conditions was counterbalanced 
using a Latin Square design to minimize the known 
disadvantages of a within-subject design such as 
carryover effects, fatigue and practice. The same 
scenario conditions were used for all participants. 
Task 
From 2009 to 2012, Honeywell partnered with 
United Airlines to develop and test an ITP 
application for a Class III Electronic Flight Bag 
(EFB) under a contract to the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) [13]. This previous research 
provided the basis for three new prototype concepts 
of ITP displays differing in the level of information 
automation assistance to the pilot for the ITP 
maneuver: Manual, Semi-Automated, and Fully 
Automated. These levels provided manipulation of 
the two information automation characteristics – 
Automation Visibility and Functional Complexity. 
Displays 
The ITP display is a vertical profile view that 
shows aircraft at flight levels above and below the 
ownship (Figure 1). No experimental task required 
information presented on a conventional plan view 
display of traffic. 
 
Figure 1. Basic Layout of ITP displays 
 
All three ITP display systems used in this 
evaluation guide the user through the process of 
formulating ITP clearance requests because 
formulating an accurate ITP clearance requires a 
broad range of inferences. The systems prompt users 
to specify parameters or perform tasks necessary for 
formulating valid requests based on the level of 
automation. 
The two automated systems (semi and fully 
automated) were designed to prevent errors during 
the process of formulating an ITP clearance. The 
systems provide feedback when errors are made; the 
error messages are intended to be descriptive and to 
communicate the cause of errors. 
The ITP display window presents information to 
formulate ITP clearance requests and shows aircraft 
within 3000 ft (above and below) of the ownship’s 
altitude. In addition to the Flight Identifier (ID), 
aircraft data tags show the ITP distance and 
groundspeed differential parameters; both are needed 
in determining whether an ITP clearance is 
appropriate. 
Table 2 summarizes the differences between the 
ITP display types used for the study. 
Table 2. Summary Description of ITP Display Types and Automated Aid provided 
 
 
Each ITP display system provides ITP 
procedural guidance in a dedicated window for 
formulating an accurate ITP clearance through a 
number of steps. An “ITP Clearance” control (button) 
is used to initiate ITP procedural guidance. 
Scenarios 
A summary of the scenarios is presented in 
Table 3. Scenario duration varied by scenario but was 
typically 5 minutes. The same dependent measures 
were recorded for all participants in all scenarios 
under all the treatment conditions. 
Figure 2 shows the general layout of the 
simulator setup for the ITP evaluation. The ITP 
display was presented in the center display console 
between the two pilots (participant and 
experimenter). The help information was provided on 
the PED outboard of the participant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Scenario Matrix 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ITP Display Set Up 
Procedure 
Participants were briefed to “think out loud” 
about their intended actions/decisions. ITP help 
information in the form of an ITP Checklist was 
available on a personal electronic device (PED) 
located outboard at all times. 
Prior to the start of each scenario, an 
experimenter who acted as a confederate participant 
read out the need for an urgent ITP climb or descent 
for the scenario due to bad weather or turbulence. For 
simplicity, the auto flight system was used to fly a 
common flight plan for all scenarios. Participants 
were required to assess ITP criteria and generate ITP 
requests in a timely and accurate manner. Although 
ITP is intended to use datalink communication, for 
this study, participants were instructed to read out 
clearances to ATC as they would communicate 
normally using voice over radio. 
Two in-scenario tasks were used to measure the 
level of participant traffic awareness. To simulate 
pilot’s normal traffic awareness role on the flight 
deck, they were required to identify all moving traffic 
elements on the display at the end of each scenario. 
They were also required to identify all traffic 
elements which did not satisfy ITP criteria. At the 
end of each scenario, the participants provided a 
Bedford workload rating associated with the ITP 
element of the scenario. Expected participant tasks 
were to: 
• Assess ITP criteria 
• Generate timely and accurate ITP requests 
(clearances) 
• Understand and respond to ITP clearances 
by ATC 
• Identify moving traffic 
• Identify non-reference traffic 
During the scenario an experimenter 
(confederate pilot) assisted by the other experimenter 
(who served as a pseudo ATC controller) collected 
real-time data such as time to generate clearances, 
participant decision and participant comments using a 
scenario datasheet 
Results  
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were used to 
explore the effects of the independent variable (ITP 
display type) on the dependent variables. In cases 
where the F-test indicated a significant effect of an 
independent variable, the Least Significant 
Difference (LSD) post-hoc test was used to 
investigate which pairs of means differ. All statistical 
tests were evaluated at a 0.05 level of significance. 
Vertical bars in all graphs denote standard error. 
Task Performance 
Only those dependent measures resulting in 
significant effects or subjective data that show 
obvious differences will be discussed below. The 
following dependent measures showed no significant 
effects: (1) Time to re-validate ATC ITP response, 
and (2) Identification of moving traffic on ITP 
display. 
Pilot Decision to Request ITP 
One scenario was specifically designed to 
investigate decision aiding aspects of the displays 
based on the information automation characteristics. 
In this scenario, the reference aircraft in the scenario 
did not meet the ITP distance requirement (ITP 
Distance > 15NM). The participant was expected to 
identify this discrepancy without requesting an ITP 
clearance (correct decision). If the participant did not 
recognize that the ITP criterion was not met and 
requested a FL change, ATC rejected the ITP request. 
Figure 3 shows the number of correct and 
incorrect decisions for each of the three displays. All 
participants correctly recognized that the ITP 
distance criterion was not satisfied for both the semi 
and full automation displays. However, for the 
manual display, four out of 12 participants made the 
incorrect decision of requesting an ITP clearance. 
However, all four participants stated that they 
understood why ATC rejected their clearance request. 
As expected the complexity of the ITP task and 
lack of automation aid resulted in decision making 
errors for the manual displays. Conversely, the lack 
of automation visibility for the fully automated 
display did not affect participant decision making and 
we believe this was because automation visibility was 
more than compensated by the automated display 
features. 
 
Figure 3. Pilot Decision-Making. 
Time to generate ITP clearance 
A plot of the average time to generate an ITP 
clearance for the three displays is shown in Figure 4 
(brackets with “*” shows conditions that were 
significantly different).There was a significant effect 
of display type (F (2, 22) = 6.73 p<0.005), such that 
the full automation display differed significantly 
from both the manual (p<0.05) and semi-automated 
displays (p<0.05), but there was no significant 
difference between the manual and semi-automated 
displays. 
 
Figure 4. Average Time to Generate ITP 
Clearance. 
Workload 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
evaluate the hypothesis that the workload level 
during ITP flight level changes is significantly 
different when using ITP displays which varied in 
information automation characteristics. We found a 
significant difference between the workload ratings 
of the three display types for ITP flight level change 
maneuvers (F (2, 22) = 3.85 p<0.05)) (see Figure 4 
(brackets with “*” shows conditions that were 
significantly different)). 
 
Figure 4. Average Workload for ITP Display 
Types. 
As Figure 4. shows, participants appeared to 
have spare capacity when using all displays (<4 
based on Bedford Workload scale definitions). A 
post-hoc analysis showed that the average workload 
rating for the fully automated ITP display was 
significantly different from both the manual and 
semi-automated displays. There was no significant 
difference in average workload between manual and 
semi-automated display types. 
Information Automation Aid 
Participants were asked to rate the degree to 
which each ITP display type aided their performance 
of the ITP task. Ratings were provided on a five-
point scale (Very High – None). The results are 
summarized in the form of a histogram in Figure 5. 
10 out of 12 participants rated the information 
provided by the fully automated display as “very 
high.” 9 out of 12 participants felt the aid provided by 
the semi-automated display was “high.” All 
participants rated the information provided by the 
manual display as either “Low” or “Moderate.” 
 
 Figure 5. Pilot Ratings for ITP Display 
Aiding. 
 
Pilot Understanding of Display Behavior 
Participants also rated their understanding of the 
ITP display functional behavior (what the system was 
doing and why). Participants provided ratings on a 
five-point scale (Very High – None). The results are 
summarized in the form of a histogram in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Pilot understanding of System 
Behavior 
Overall, participants appeared to understand the 
functional behavior of all the display systems. The 
results of the head tracking data analysis suggest that 
referral to help material in the semi-automated 
condition was to confirm automation behavior 
whereas referral to the help material for the manual 
condition was to perform the task manually. 
Potential for Human Errors 
Participants were asked to identify and list any 
aspect of the design of ITP displays that could make 
the flightcrew vulnerable to error after using all three 
display types. As shown in the histogram 
summarizing the results in Figure 7, all participants 
(12 of 12) felt the manual display had a potential for 
error. One half of the participants (6 of 12) felt the 
semi-automated version was not vulnerable to error. 
A slight majority (7 of 12) felt the fully automated 
display had aspects vulnerable to error. 
 
Figure 7. Potential Error 
Discussion 
Pilots made more ITP request decision making 
errors when using the Manual ITP display compared 
to the other display types. This was expected because 
of the complexity of the ITP task and lack of 
automation aid in the Manual concept.  Pilots made 
correct decisions when using the fully automated 
display suggesting that the low automation visibility 
did not have an effect.  The time to generate an ITP 
clearance (task performance) for the Full automation 
display was significantly shorter than both the 
Manual and Semi-automated displays. The average 
workload rating for the fully automated ITP display 
was significantly lower than both the Manual and 
Semi-automated. Participant ratings indicate that the 
automated displays were better than the manual 
displays on several dimensions – they better aided 
their ITP task performance, they led to a better 
understanding of what the automation was doing, and 
they had lower potential for error.  
Based on the results of the empirical study, we 
developed and iterated recommendations for the 
design and evaluation of information automation 
systems. These initial recommendations will require 
more complete and thorough validation studies. 
Functional Complexity 
a) If information automation systems are 
functionally complex, help functions might 
be appropriate for non-time critical 
situations. 
Many information automation systems such as 
decision and management aids may be strategic in 
nature. Consequently, one solution to managing and 
understanding the complexity of these systems is a 
help function. Help functions in strategic situations 
could serve not only as a real-time aid in 
understanding a system’s behavior or its outputs, but 
it could serve as an augmentation to training and 
knowledge maintenance as well.  
b) The functional complexity of an information 
automation system should be assessed in 
terms of pilot ability to understand the 
system’s behavior even if there is little or no 
interaction required.  
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1302-1 [14] 
describes the need to consider the functional 
complexity of installed equipment when assessing 
whether pilots can safely perform all of their tasks. 
Introducing pilot responsibilities in conjunction with 
complex information automation, regardless of 
whether it is a system which requires substantial 
interaction, may affect pilot performance and require 
pilot understanding of system state and behavior 
consistent with 14 CFR25.1302 (c) (1).  
c) Information automation functional and 
display complexity can compromise usability 
– in some cases it may be better to have a 
less capable system that reduces complexity 
and is easier to use.  
Adding new functions to an existing display are 
often seen as a way to improve operational safety and 
efficiency. Each additional function can add to the 
complexity of a single system or device in terms of 
pilots’ understanding of its behavior and the ease of 
interacting with the device as defined in 14 CFR 
25.1302 (b) and (c). This could negatively affect user 
workload and the overall usability of the system. 
Automation Visibility 
a) Information for verifying or checking system 
reasoning and output should be available and 
displayed in a manner that is easy to detect 
and easy to access.  
14 CFR 25.1302(b) (3) states that 
“…information intended for the flightcrew’s use 
must enable flightcrew awareness … of the effects on 
the airplane or systems resulting from flightcrew 
actions.” Crew awareness includes understanding the 
limitations of information automation systems. The 
complexity of the task, the design of the interface, 
and the saliency of the information all play a role in 
whether pilots can detect inaccuracies. Even in cases 
of high automation visibility, where the automation 
reveals its reasoning to the pilot, it is often difficult to 
notice what is not there. Thus the interface should 
provide support to help pilots know what information 
to look for to assess information automation output. 
Explanations of system behavior and states, and 
quality of information outputs should be available 
upon demand. 
b) Presentation of information to help pilots 
understand information automation state and 
outputs should be balanced against potential 
increases in pilot workload due to the time 
and attention needed to process this extra 
information. 
The requirement for operationally relevant 
system behavior to be predictable and unambiguous 
(§ 25.1302 (c) (1)) will enable a qualified flightcrew 
to know what the system is doing and why. This 
means a flightcrew should have enough information 
about what the system will do under foreseeable 
circumstances as a result of their action or a changing 
situation that they can operate the system safely. This 
requirement distinguishes system behavior from the 
functional logic within the system design, much of 
which the flightcrew does not know or need to know. 
[AC 25.1302-1, 5-6.a. (2)]. In some cases, a small 
amount of automation visibility information, or 
automation visibility information that can be 
accessed on demand but not presented automatically, 
should be considered. If visibility information can be 
built into the information automation outputs 
themselves, less processing may be required to 
validate the outputs. Providing too much automation 
visibility information, especially in busy phases of 
flight, could create workload issues. 
Conclusions 
Our work also provided insights in terms of 
useful future research to examine open questions 
about information automation. While not meant to be 
comprehensive, some of our initial thoughts are 
provided below. 
Assess the tradeoffs between automation 
visibility and increased pilot workload and task 
times 
It was clear from our empirical study that 
automation visibility comes with a potential cost in 
workload and task time. While our results showed 
modest evidence for improved performance with 
better automation visibility, there were more obvious 
results in terms of higher workload and task times for 
conditions where automation visibility was higher. 
Research is needed to better understand these 
tradeoffs and identify cases where the benefits of 
more visibility information outweigh the increases in 
workload and task times so that design and 
evaluation guidance can be developed related to how 
much additional automation visibility information is 
appropriate for different situations. 
Assess the impact of aggregate information 
automation systems 
Many of the issues identified in these analyses 
are likely to be most problematic at an aggregated 
level – when multiple information automation 
systems are considered. These issues include 
information overload, workload, distraction, over-
trust, and so on. Research which addresses these 
aggregated effects is needed to fully understand some 
of the overall consequences of adding more and more 
information automation systems to the flight deck. 
Due to the fact that the effects of implementing 
multiple information automation systems may or may 
not be additive in nature, this research could help 
system evaluators understand potentially complex 
interactions. 
Based on the results of the study, we identified 
human factors considerations which are consistent 
with existing FAA regulatory and guidance material 
for the design and evaluation of information 
automation systems. For example, with respect to 
information automation visibility, we suggest that 
information for verifying system logic and output 
should be available and displayed in a manner that is 
easy to use. However, this display of information to 
help pilots should be balanced against potential 
increases in pilot workload due to the time and 
attention needed to process this extra information.  
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